Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Mon, 02 October 2017 21:51 UTC

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 17:51:49 -0400
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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On Mon, Oct 2, 2017 at 5:43 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>; wrote:

> > For starters, though, I'd be interested answers from the authors
> > to two quick questions, though I suspect I can guess 'em:
> >
> > 1. TLS1.3 has had significant formal analysis. Did the authors
> > or other proponents here do any such work and if so can you send
> > a pointer to your results? If not, then I believe the onus is on
> > the folks who want to break TLS to do that work themselves if they
> > want to make a serious proposal and it is not ok IMO to try put
> > that work onto the community who have been working hard for years
> > to make TLS stronger.
>
> I would be willing to work with the people that did the formal analysis to
> show the impact of including the extension, and making changes to the
> extension that are indicated by that analysis.
>

If you're feeling enterprising, at least one model for TLS 1.3 is open
source.

https://github.com/tls13tamarin/TLS13Tamarin

I'm told that it takes a good part of an hour to run, though, so be
prepared.

--Richard




> > 2. Which of the hundreds of applications making use of TLS did
> > you analyse before proposing this? If only a handful, then same
> > comment wrt where the onus ought lie.
>
> Just like TLS 1.3 has been implemented and tested with many applications
> during its development, I would expect the same to happen in those
> environments where there is interest in making use of this extension.
>
> Russ
>
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