Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard

["Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[e-mail]>]

It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible. 

I say leave it in.

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> One small nit.
> 
>> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy
> I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach?
> 
> Tim
> —
> Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc.
> 
> On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" <[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>    Hi Simon, 
> 
>    Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in our version 04. Please see my comments inline. 
> 
>    Yours, 
>    Daniel
> 
>    -----Original Message-----
>    From: TLS [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Simon Friedberger
>    Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM
>    To: [e-mail]
>    Cc: [e-mail]
>    Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
> 
>    Nits:
> 
>        RFC 4279 reference is missing.
>    MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the Normative reference as well  as in the introduction at line 127,  in section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know. 
> 
> 
> 
>        "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
>    MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
> 
>>    On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote:
>> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
>> (tls) to consider the following document:
>> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
>>   Security (TLS)'
>>  <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
>> 
>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits 
>> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the 
>> [e-mail] mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may 
>> be sent to [e-mail] instead. In either case, please retain the 
>> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>> 
>> Abstract
>> 
>> 
>>   This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
>>   Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  The cipher suites are all based on
>>   the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
>>   (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
>>   with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  PSK
>>   provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
>>   forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
>>   integrity protection.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The file can be obtained via
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
>> 
>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/
>> 
>> 
>> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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