Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt> (Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Informational RFC

(2011/02/24 3:00), Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> On 02/23/2011 06:29 PM, The IESG wrote:
>>
>> The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to
>> consider the following document: - 'Addition of the Camellia Cipher
>> Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)'
>> <draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00.txt>  as an Informational RFC
>>
>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and
>> solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive
>> comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-03-23.
>> Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In
>> either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow
>> automated sorting.
>>
>> The file can be obtained via
>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kanno-tls-camellia/
>
> I see that this document defines ciphersuites with a PRF based on
> SHA384... However it does not specify the verify_data_length, thus
> the default value of 12 applies, and the SHA384 PRF is being truncated
> to 96 bits. Is this intentional? If yes, then what is the purpose to
> use the SHA384 as PRF?
>

Hi Nikos,

Thank you for your comment.

I think that the verify_data_length with a PRF based on
SHA384 is specified in RFC5246.
As a result, I refer to RFC5246 as well as other documents( e.g., 
RFC5289, RFC5487, and draft-nsri-tls-aria etc.,) in our document.

I think that your comment is not only our draft but all documents 
specifying the PRF base on SHA384 for TLS.

What do you think?

Regards,
Satoru

> regards,
> Nikos
>
>
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-- 
Satoru Kanno

Security Business Unit
Mobile and Security Solution Business Group
NTT Software Corporation

e-mail: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp