Re: [TLS] Server behavior when client certificate does not match the request ?

On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 4:13 PM, Fabrice Gautier <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> > With TLS 1.2, where the server does send a supported_signature_algorithms
> > list, clients that use signatures other than those listed should
> > expect to run into servers that reject this with a fatal alert.
> > The server's TLS stack (not its X.509 chain verification code) has
> > to check the signature in the client's "Certifice Verify" message.
>
> Which does raise another interesting question when certificate_types
> and supported_signature_algorithms conflicts.

It's the intersection:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.4

   -  Any certificates provided by the client MUST be signed using a
      hash/signature algorithm pair found in
      supported_signature_algorithms.

   -  The end-entity certificate provided by the client MUST contain a
      key that is compatible with certificate_types.  If the key is a
      signature key, it MUST be usable with some hash/signature
      algorithm pair in supported_signature_algorithms.

However, it's confusing, and so we removed certificate_types in 1.3.

-Ekr

>
> > The server's list of CA's on the other hand is largely a hint, and
> > clients often just ignore it entirely.  If the server can verify
> > the certificate, it generally does not matter whether the CA was
> > listed in the certificate request message or not.  For many servers
> > client certificates are optional anyway, or they verify them without
> > reference to any particular PKI.
> >
> > --
> >         Viktor.
> >
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