Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com> Tue, 06 October 2020 23:11 UTC
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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2020 16:11:28 -0700
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To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
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> > Please just tell me why I'm wrong and I'll feel > > better since we won't have to malign another cute > > furry animal. > I've told you already why I believe you're wrong here. At this point, it won't do much good to continue posting about this list on the list. My suggestion to you is to study the problem offline, and If you find an attack and can demonstrate the works, then bring it back to the list. It would also be helpful to look at implementations in order to understand how others have interpreted the HRR code path. I bet this would clear up many of your questions. Chris P.
- [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Christopher Patton
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Christopher Patton
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Michael D'Errico
- [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (wa… Christopher Patton
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (wa… Nick Harper
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (wa… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2 Ilari Liusvaara