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Re: [TLS] Deployment ... Re: This working group has failed

Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Wed, 27 November 2013 01:51 UTC

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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2013 17:51:14 -0800
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Peter Gutmann <p.gutmann@auckland.ac.nz>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Deployment ... Re: This working group has failed
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On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 5:46 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 7:05 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 5:51 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>>>> Do you really think that "completely insecure against active attack"
>>>> is a good option?
>>>
>>> For some things, yes.  Specifically: SMTP.
>>
>> Why?
>
> I'm  talking about SMTP between MTAs, not SUBMIT (SMTP between MUAs
> and MSAs).  With that clarification:
>
> Because it's more important that e-mail flow and be delivered than
> that it be hop-by-hop secure.

Then let those programs use some kind of hack to turn off
authentication if they really know what they're doing.  (SMTP isn't
hop-by-hop secure, regardless of TLS.)

>
>> My .msmtprc contains (excerpted):
>
> You're talking about mail submission.  This part needs to use TLS
> securely, of course, though mostly only because your MSA wants to
> authenticate you using a plain username and password authentication
> method.

Nearly the entire web works by sending plain usernames and passwords
over TLS, for better or for worse.

--Andy

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