Re: [TLS] network-based security solution use cases

Flemming Andreasen <fandreas@cisco.com> Tue, 07 November 2017 23:27 UTC

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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>, "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
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From: Flemming Andreasen <fandreas@cisco.com>
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Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 18:27:56 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] network-based security solution use cases
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Thanks for taking an initial look at the document Stephen - please see 
below for responses so far

On 11/7/17 4:13 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> Hiya,
>
> On 07/11/17 02:48, Flemming Andreasen wrote:
>> We didn't draw any particular line, but the use case scenarios that we
>> tried to highlight are those related to overall security and regulatory
>> requirements (including public sector)
> I had a quick look at the draft (will try read properly en-route to
> ietf-100) and I followed the reference to [1] but that only lead to a
> forest of documents in which I didn't find any reference to breaking
> TLS so far at least. Can you provide an explicit pointer to the
> exact document on which that claim is based?
For NERC, you can look underĀ  "(CIP) Critital Infrastructure 
Protection". CIP-005-5 for example covers the electronic security 
perimeter, which has a couple of relevant requirements and associated text:

http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=CIP-005-5&title=Cyber%20Security%20-%20Electronic%20Security%20Perimeter(s)&jurisdiction=United%20States 


To be clear though, the document does not specifically call out breaking 
TLS, but it does clearly call out the need to detect malicious inbound 
and outbound communications by leveraging an "Electronic Access Point" 
(e.g. IDS/IPS) to enforce the Electronic Security Perimeter.
> I'd also claim that your reference to PCI-DSS is misleading, as that
> same spec also explicitly calls for there to be good key management
> specifically including minimising the number of copies of keys, so
> at most, one might be able to claim that PCI-DSS is ok with people
> who break TLS in a nod-and-a-wink manner. But if you do have a real
> quote from PCI-DSS that calls for breaking TLS then please do also
> send that (it's been asked for a bunch of times without any answer
> being provided so far).

I will need to look more closely for such a quote - if anybody else 
knows of one, please chime in as well.

Thanks

-- Flemming


> Thanks,
> S.
>
>
> [1]
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-00.html#ref-NERCCIP
>