Re: [TLS] WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-04

Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> Fri, 07 July 2017 19:13 UTC

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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 14:13:28 -0500
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To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-04
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As a note, I didn't see anything in this draft (from a quick read)
that precludes any of DANE's Certificate Usage, Selector, or Matching
Type fields. If that's not the case, perhaps someone can correct me.

   A client must not be able to force a server to perform lookups on
   arbitrary domain names using this mechanism.  Therefore, a server
   MUST NOT construct chains for domain names other than its own.

What about the reverse? Do we care about a server tricking a client
into priming its DNS cache?

-tom

On 28 June 2017 at 16:15, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>; wrote:
> This is the working group last call for
> draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-04.  Please send you comments to the
> list by July 12, 2017.
>
> Thanks,
>
> J&S
>
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