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Re: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms

Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com> Tue, 12 January 2016 01:28 UTC

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Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 17:28:33 -0800
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms
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On 1/11/16 at 4:32 PM, watsonbladd@gmail.com (Watson Ladd) wrote:

>Do the RFCs require the relevant checks or not? And given that
>implementations frequently get these sorts of things wrong, how do we
>make the standard robust against it?

The best way I can think of is to test to see if the checks are 
being done. For example, if a implementation is supposed to 
check if a number is prime, send a non-prime and see if it takes 
the correct action.

Publicly available test suites would be a good step toward 
implementing this strategy. I will note that as the Javascript 
standards people were developing the ES2015 standard, they 
maintained a test suite which following the evolving standard.

Cheers - Bill

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