Re: [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted
"Gregory S. Chudov" <chudov@cryptopro.ru> Mon, 27 February 2006 16:40 UTC
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From: "Gregory S. Chudov" <chudov@cryptopro.ru>
To: tls@ietf.org, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
References: <20060225194251.E1E7F222437@laser.networkresonance.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2006 19:41:55 +0300
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First comments: 1) This draft proposes a new enumerated type, HashType, which is not mentioned in IANA Considerations section, so it is unclear, how new hash types can be defined. Also, would be nice to allocate a value for gost. 7.4.1.4.7 Cert Hash Types Proposed addition: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- enum{ - md5(0), sha1(1), sha256(2), sha512(3), (255) + md5(0), sha1(1), sha256(2), sha512(3), gostR3411(4), (255) } HashType; ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Proposed addition: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- HashType values are divided into three groups: 1. Values from 0 (zero) through 63 decimal (0x3F) inclusive are reserved for IETF Standards Track protocols. 2. Values from 64 decimal (0x40) through 223 decimal (0xDF) inclusive are reserved for assignment for non-Standards Track methods. 3. Values from 224 decimal (0xE0) through 255 decimal (0xFF) inclusive are reserved for private use. Additional information describing the role of IANA in the allocation of HashType code points is described in Section 11. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- There are a lot of MD5 certificates still around. Are they now intentionaly forbidden by default? ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Clients SHOULD send this extension if they support any algorithm other than SHA-1. If this extension is not used, servers SHOULD assume that the client supports only SHA-1. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. IANA Considerations Chapter 7.4.4 became 7.4.5, but the references in IANA Considerations section is not updated. By the way, rfc2246bis contains a typo here too - it references 7.4.3 instead of 7.4.4. Proposed change: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- - Section 7.4.3 describes a TLS ClientCertificateType Registry to be + Section 7.4.5 describes a TLS ClientCertificateType Registry to be maintained by the IANA, as defining a number of such code point identifiers. ClientCertificateType identifiers with values in the range 0-63 (decimal) inclusive are assigned via RFC 2434 Standards Action. Values from the range 64-223 (decimal) inclusive are assigned via [RFC 2434] Specification Required. Identifier values from 224-255 (decimal) inclusive are reserved for RFC 2434 Private Use. The registry will be initially populated with the values in this - document, Section 7.4.4. + document, Section 7.4.5. + Section 7.4.1.4.7 describes a TLS HashType Registry to be + maintained by the IANA, as defining a number of such code point + identifiers. HashType identifiers with values in the + range 0-63 (decimal) inclusive are assigned via RFC 2434 Standards + Action. Values from the range 64-223 (decimal) inclusive are assigned + via [RFC 2434] Specification Required. Identifier values from + 224-255 (decimal) inclusive are reserved for RFC 2434 Private Use. + The registry will be initially populated with the values in this + document, Section 7.4.4. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- And some more invalid section numbers: Table of Contents ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 7.4.10. Certificate verify 64 - 7.4.10. Finished 65 + 7.4.10. Finished 65 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 7.4.9. Finished ----------------------------------------------------------------------- The value handshake_messages includes all handshake messages starting at client hello up to, but not including, this finished message. This - may be different from handshake_messages in Section 7.4.8 because it + may be different from handshake_messages in Section 7.4.10 because it ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 7.1. Change cipher spec protocol ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (See section 6.1.) The change cipher spec message is sent during the handshake after the security parameters have been agreed upon, but - before the verifying finished message is sent (see section 7.4.9). + before the verifying finished message is sent (see section 7.4.11). ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 7.4.10. Certificate verify 7.4.10. Finished ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -7.4.10. Finished +7.4.11. Finished ----------------------------------------------------------------------- F.1.1. Authentication and key exchange ----------------------------------------------------------------------- generate the finished messages, encryption keys, and MAC secrets (see - Sections 7.4.8, 7.4.9 and 6.3). By sending a correct finished + Sections 7.4.10, 7.4.11 and 6.3). By sending a correct finished message, parties thus prove that they know the correct pre_master_secret. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- F.1.1.2. RSA key exchange and authentication ----------------------------------------------------------------------- - the certificate verify message (see Section 7.4.8). The client signs + the certificate verify message (see Section 7.4.10). The client signs ----------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- Re: [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted jimmy
- [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] New TLS 1.2 draft submitted Gregory S. Chudov