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Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 06 December 2015 03:39 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 05 Dec 2015 19:38:54 -0800
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI
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On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 5:58 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> Can we embed an EncryptedExtension inside an existing EE?
>

I'm not sure I understand the design you're suggesting.



>   That would let us do TOR purely within TLS, right?
>

See above.



>
> You said “in the interest of explicit signaling” but I think you meant in
> the interest of avoiding that, right?
>

No, I don't think so. One option would be to simply send a new tunneled
application data
type without any explicit signaling and the other would be to have an
(encrypted) extension which indicated that that is what you are doing. I am
endorsing the latter..



> I still think the “inner/real SNI” is simpler, but will have to think
> about the two.
>
>
>
> --
>
> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
>
> IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz
>

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