Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair

Alex Elsayed <eternaleye@gmail.com> Thu, 11 July 2013 21:05 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] User Defined Key Pair
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Dan Harkins wrote:

> 
>   Hi Omar,
> 
> On Thu, July 11, 2013 2:42 am, OMAR HASSAN (RIT Student) wrote:
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>> I had a quick look at your work item, and I have some questions:
>>
>> What will be the consequences if the server data has be stolen? will the
>> attacker be able to impersonate as the user?
> 
>   Successfully stealing records from the server's password file will
> enable the thief to impersonate the client (back to the hacked server)
> for all stolen records.
> 
>> How will the password be stored in the server initially?
> 
>   That is completely up to the server.
> 
>> How will you handle TLS termination that is used many websites to
>> centralize the related measurements and protection against the common SSL
>> attacks in one place, and to allow the application firewalls to validate
>> and check the incoming requests for application-level attacks such as SQL
>> injection and cross-site scripting?
> 
>   This is really an operational question. At the risk of sounding flippant
> I guess I'd just say it will be handled in the best way possible.
> 
>   You claim in your draft that "UDKP aims to completely replace the TLS
> protocol." That is a much more ambitious goal and you will need to handle
> these sorts of issues. The tls-pwd draft just defines certificate-less
> ciphersuites that are resistant to dictionary attack (and are better than
> the various PSK ciphersuites) for use with the existing TLS protocol.

<snip>

I'd like to also point out:

TLS-SRP: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5054
TLS-AugPAKE: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shin-tls-augpake-00

Both are:

* Password-authenticated
* Do not involve CAs at all
* Do not allow a compromised server to impersonate the user
    - Zero-knowledge password proofs are rather useful
* Are designed to work with TLS, rather than replace it wholesale

While RFC 5054 is Informational rather than Standards track, it is supported 
by OpenSSL since 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 (https://www.openssl.org/news/news.html) 
and GnuTLS since at least 2007.