Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt

David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Wed, 11 July 2018 17:38 UTC

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2018 13:37:46 -0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
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On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 12:58 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> Thanks for writing this.
>>
>> I would be in favor of deprecating old versions of TLS prior to 1.2.
>> Firefox Telemetry shows that about 1% of our connections are TLS 1.1
>>
>
> This should be 1.0.
>
>
> (on the same data set, TLS 1.3 is > 5%), and TLS 1.1 is negligible.
>>
>> This is probably a higher number than we'd be comfortable turning off
>> immediately, but it is probably worth starting the process.
>>
>
Metrics from Chrome report 0.43% of our connections are TLS 1.0 and 0.03%
of them are TLS 1.1, which is a similar situation. I too am in favor of
deprecating them and getting things started.

David

On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Kathleen Moriarty <
>> kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> Stephen and I posted the draft below to see if the TLS working group
>>> is ready to take steps to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  There has
>>> been a recent drop off in usage for web applications due to the PCI
>>> Council recommendation to move off TLSv1.0, with a recommendation to
>>> go to TLSv1.2 by June 30th.  NIST has also been recommending TLSv1.2
>>> as a baseline.  Applications other than those using HTTP may not have
>>> had the same reduction in usage.  If you are responsible for services
>>> where you have a reasonable vantage point to gather and share
>>> statistics to assess usage further, that could be helpful for the
>>> discussion.  We've received some feedback that has been incorporated
>>> into the working draft and feelers in general have been positive.  It
>>> would be good to know if there are any show stoppers that have not
>>> been considered.
>>>
>>> https://github.com/sftcd/tls-oldversions-diediedie
>>>
>>> Thanks in advance,
>>> Kathleen
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>>> Date: Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 3:05 PM
>>> Subject: New Version Notification for
>>> draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
>>> To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>ie>, Kathleen Moriarty
>>> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A new version of I-D, draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
>>> has been successfully submitted by Stephen Farrell and posted to the
>>> IETF repository.
>>>
>>> Name:           draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
>>> Revision:       00
>>> Title:          Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
>>> Document date:  2018-06-18
>>> Group:          Individual Submission
>>> Pages:          10
>>> URL:
>>>
>>> https://www.ietf..org/internet-drafts/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
>>> <https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt>
>>> Status:
>>>
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie/
>>> Htmlized:
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00
>>> Htmlized:
>>>
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
>>>
>>>
>>> Abstract:
>>>    This document [if approved] formally deprecates Transport Layer
>>>    Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
>>>    these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
>>>    for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
>>>    industry profiiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
>>>    these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
>>>    IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
>>>    away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
>>>    increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
>>>    for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
>>>    additional effort for library and product maintenance.
>>>
>>>    This document updates the backward compatibility sections of TLS RFCs
>>>    [[list TBD]] to prohibit fallback to TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  This
>>>    document also updates RFC 7525.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>> submission
>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>>
>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Kathleen
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>
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