Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 18 April 2018 20:56 UTC

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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2018 16:56:39 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
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> On Apr 18, 2018, at 4:52 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> 
> Secondary point.  Still don't think we should deliberately include undefined fields, e.g., because part of the discussion is whether 16 bits is the right size.

16 bits is clearly enough.  If the units are hours that gets you ~7.5 years.  Pinning for less than an hour is pointless, it then becomes smaller than typical DNS TTLs for the TLSA  RRset the client got previously, which it can cache without any pinning.

Pinning for more than 7.5 years is absurd, it only protect clients that connect less than twice per decade...

-- 
	Viktor.