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[TLS] Inter-protocol attacks

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Sat, 09 August 2014 15:04 UTC

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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Inter-protocol attacks
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Dear all,
By combining fallback to SSLv3 and session ID based resumption, it is
possible to do some major damage. This is due to  Antoine
Delignat-Lavaud according to whois. Slides are at
https://bh.ht.vc/bh_slides.pdf. This depends on subtleties of TLS
configuration and interactions with the same origin policy, and
results in the sort of thing you don't want to see.

Moral of the story: simplify, simplify, simplify!

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

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