Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 07 July 2017 18:21 UTC

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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>, Matthew Green <matthewdgreen@gmail.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01
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Hi Russ,

On 07/07/17 17:35, Russ Housley wrote:
> Repeating from above, the non-ephemeral DH keys are associated only
> with sessions that are inside the enterprise datacenter.

I find it really hard to believe anyone is convinced of that.

Yes, one could chose to use this proposed wiretapping scheme
like that but figure 3 in the draft makes if fully clear that
this colluding or coerced wiretapping device can be anywhere
on the Internet.

2804 says "no" here - are you proposing to obsolete that? If
so, being up-front about that is IMO a pre-requisite and talk
of "datacentres" avoided as the misdirection that it is.

Again, I hope the chairs do not devote/waste more time on this
until there is a demonstrated IETF consensus to obsolete 2804.
We cannot honestly have both this and that.

S.