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Re: [TLS] How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake?

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Mon, 24 October 2016 18:15 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake?
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Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2016 18:15:42 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake?
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> How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake, if previous public keys and/or certificate hashes are not cached?

Nobody does revocation on the web, for some almost all encompassing definition of nobody.

Instead, OCSP and OCSP stapling.

> I cannot see this in the standard. Considering that all one has to do is DDOS a certificate authority nowadays...

General PKI and key lifecycle issues are, properly, not part of the TLS spec.

	/r$

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