[TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa-00.txt

Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Mon, 04 November 2024 14:17 UTC

Return-Path: <hkario@redhat.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3292C207975 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 4 Nov 2024 06:17:59 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.249
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.249 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.148, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IazU9jCKPSos for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 4 Nov 2024 06:17:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFFD4C1F58AC for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 4 Nov 2024 06:17:55 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1730729874; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=LJRppQ03m4tr+vh+FBmsvz6re2jKzOpBpo5mE4VdGuE=; b=AeMN74kzq+dCogkhY2n2Kz8cANLajGztHCCgDVQldmCO0V1dCJWguZ3o7CJV7f2iZe69JV amwbr2XlY0wvvsiH2IzH9bu9phcAQ1j+8ERkIi5VaolXdY1GIFjDHa8vPUBOigU6W2nJr+ nbHED75jeJ0wjFWdNhnzCXchlwR4po4=
Received: from mail-wr1-f72.google.com (mail-wr1-f72.google.com [209.85.221.72]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-34-ZLwyxW4fOu6WBYA57MP9eQ-1; Mon, 04 Nov 2024 09:17:53 -0500
X-MC-Unique: ZLwyxW4fOu6WBYA57MP9eQ-1
Received: by mail-wr1-f72.google.com with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-37d4d51b4efso1881890f8f.3 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 04 Nov 2024 06:17:53 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1730729872; x=1731334672; h=content-transfer-encoding:user-agent:organization:references :in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:date:subject:cc:to:from :x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=pUDIVa50YXNT94LONCWRKKQFMzFlKqkCh6RhZluUQec=; b=NRXbdqNgdwAMzYwyEhPyzeOXJhZ5lKyf5vyuVqktl30DTP2ZAPEUWlybtwRfDSWKYD oSXhCDiZ9Xu/zlXFbB4RBucnZBQpGVsB+vbsCg45P6VveeN4TyO2udmTO+ylFI5uU1DP CY0j0yds8eAc3zBQP0JodYnZxQY7R67rv7CCbmPsq2u4FQGo0viFPJkflwCszEcvxHIK Sv8IAXY/Roj4x2eLbdwUlpkq49kuCHYnjOKtlvBspmmPESEj1qiiGtXMllf2dVx5ZTCx gCTXmsVdvpCr+58Q2PJTlTWuX7g0iLNgaGZXX4UCgCIztf4WN0+193txubxAg9R/Qwkg g+6g==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxODvCCCS1yvcjVKRhcQ3V1tEht2L43gJeyLJW+jxPBhKrCW8em alDoL6U00AQZJ+F/OjQ4OigefrgZaNKJpNjgddooQN4j5WrqhUhRjJoLpiIqnURrVm43sQZtRpa qaIuGV88wewMBbsrExZUCrTxJVLuGI7lBzNBNWXsPSTKC7TZ4
X-Received: by 2002:a5d:50cf:0:b0:37d:45ab:4241 with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-380610f2e8emr23343978f8f.12.1730729872207; Mon, 04 Nov 2024 06:17:52 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IG1eVFrTJRQLdXdXfry6+gab3sjUA6C5bX4eQy2yuYmnsMW8OqTtpjK6Z3r3XBM2oFQv3+KOQ==
X-Received: by 2002:a5d:50cf:0:b0:37d:45ab:4241 with SMTP id ffacd0b85a97d-380610f2e8emr23343960f8f.12.1730729871799; Mon, 04 Nov 2024 06:17:51 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (ip-94-112-13-93.bb.vodafone.cz. [94.112.13.93]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ffacd0b85a97d-381c10b7d20sm13480440f8f.7.2024.11.04.06.17.51 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 04 Nov 2024 06:17:51 -0800 (PST)
From: Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 04 Nov 2024 15:17:50 +0100
MIME-Version: 1.0
Message-ID: <5b40bab7-e434-4412-aea3-545a18b22284@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAFpG3gcVZ184JX3FWjQo5CUi+MEnrNK7MWVB+iz7wMwp7oYrXg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <173059220278.350115.6583095374531712492@dt-datatracker-84cf84bdcc-hlxgg> <CAFpG3gcVZ184JX3FWjQo5CUi+MEnrNK7MWVB+iz7wMwp7oYrXg@mail.gmail.com>
Organization: Red Hat
User-Agent: Trojita/0.7-git; Qt/5.15.14; xcb; Linux; Fedora release 39 (Thirty Nine)
X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0
X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-ID-Hash: 6PZ3VYY5MMSHPSRWDSA6IPCHIEF54G3R
X-Message-ID-Hash: 6PZ3VYY5MMSHPSRWDSA6IPCHIEF54G3R
X-MailFrom: hkario@redhat.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa-00.txt
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/HhBrhfoxyj50_quU4surT2W0aU4>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>

Hello,

I don't think we should go back to signing with PKCS#1 v1.5 in TLSv1.3.

I'm opposed to including those two IDs:

     mldsa44_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x090C),
     mldsa65_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 (0x090D),

Theoretically we could require the RSA part to still make PSS signatures
but I think that would be rather hard on the cryptographic backends...
So I'd rather not have them.

On Sunday, 3 November 2024 01:07:34 CET, tirumal reddy wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> The draft 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa/ 
> specifies how ML-DSA in combination with traditional algorithms 
> can be used for authentication in TLS 1.3. 
>
> Comments and suggestions are welcome.
>
> Regards,
> - Tiru
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2024 at 05:33
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa-00.txt
> To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <kondtir@gmail.com>, John Gray 
> <john.gray@entrust.com>, Scott Fluhrer <sfluhrer@cisco.com>, 
> Timothy Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>
>
>
> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa-00.txt has
> been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:     draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa
> Revision: 00
> Title:    Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
> Date:     2024-11-02
> Group:    Individual Submission
> Pages:    8
> URL:      
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa-00.txt
> Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa/
> HTML:    
>  https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa-00.html
> HTMLized: 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tls-reddy-composite-mldsa
>
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This document specifies how the post-quantum signature scheme ML-DSA
>    [FIPS204], in combination with traditional algorithms RSA-
>    PKCS#1v1.5,RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 can be used for
>    authentication in TLS 1.3.  The composite ML-DSA approach is
>    beneficial in deployments where operators seek additional protection
>    against potential breaks or catastrophic bugs in ML-DSA.
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>

-- 
Regards,
Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario
Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic