Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling
Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Sat, 12 December 2015 04:54 UTC
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Date: Sat, 12 Dec 2015 15:54:36 +1100
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling
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I think that the best way to deal with the status_request_v2 extension is to make it a proper part of the TLS 1.3 messages, probably Certificate or CertificateVerify. This is a fairly heavily important extension. On 12 December 2015 at 05:52, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote: > When looking at stuff some more, I noticed that extension > status_request_v2, which is used by OCSP stapling and is not deprecated > [1]. > > Now, that extension uses additional handshake message type > (certificate_status), which is specified to go between Certificate > and SKE. Now, TLS 1.3 does not have SKE, and closest equivalent is > server CertificateVerify. But OTOH, Cerficate/CertificateVerify/ > Finished are supposed to form a block? Where it is supposed to go? > > Then there are other supported extensions that add messages. > Specifically the following messages: > > - certificate_url: This can replace client certificate, whic is > straightforward (if causing security issues by its sheer nature). > - supplemental_data: There's ladder diagrams placing this just > before Certificate. Where should this go in TLS 1.3 (there are > undeprecated extensions that would use it)? > > > [1] Unlike status_request, which is listed as deprecated. Was > that intentional or mistake (if intentional, cert_type would also be a > good to deprecate as superceded). > > > -Ilari > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 and OCSP stapling Ilari Liusvaara