Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

Dan Brown <> Tue, 18 November 2014 16:53 UTC

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From: Dan Brown <>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 16:53:08 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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Some similarity between the OPTLS proposal and some previous key agreements 
schemes may be relevant.  The main benefit of such similarity is that portions 
of the previous security analysis (whether security proofs, or lack of 
attacks) of the previous schemes may be applicable to OPTLS.  In other words, 
OPTLS is not a radically new design. Obviously, the details by which OPTLS 
differs from previous schemes can be also be very important, especially with 
different goals and fixes to defects.

One previous similar scheme is Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes (BJM) key 
agreement (protocol 1). Specifically, if one replaces the initiator (client) 
static key with the ephemeral key in the BJM protocol, then BJM derives an 
authentication key in a way similar to OPTLS, and derives a separate session 
key from both ephemerals, similar to OPTLS.

Another previous similar scheme is the unified model key agreement from NIST 
SP 800-56A (and ANSI X9.63).  As with BJM, OPTLS differs from Unified in that 
OPTS replaces a static key from one side (the client) with the ephemeral key, 
and derives several types of keys (instead of just one in Unified model).  The 
unified model key agreement has the defect of key-compromise impersonation 
(KCI attacks), but that does not seem to apply to OPTLS if the client is 

Best regards,


From: TLS [] On Behalf Of Hugo Krawczyk
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 8:54 PM
Cc: Hoeteck Wee
Subject: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

During the TLS interim meeting of last week (Oct 22 2014) I suggested that TLS
1.3 should abandon signature-based authentication (other than for 
and be based solely on a combination of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman for PFS and
static Diffie-Hellman for authentication. This has multiple benefits including
major performance gain (by replacing the per-handshake RSA signature by the
server with a much cheaper elliptic curve exponentiation), compatibility with
the mechanisms required for forward secrecy, natural accommodation of a 0-RTT
option, and a simple extension without signatures for client authentication.

Below I present a schematic representation of the proposed protocol referred
to as OPTLS where OPT stands for OPTimized and/or for One-Point-Three.
The presentation is sketchy and omits the exact procedure for key derivation.
The latter is a crucial component for the security of the protocol, but
before getting into these details we want to get a sense of whether the WG is
interested in this approach. In the meantime, Hoeteck Wee and myself are
working on the details of the protocol and the security proof.

We describe a setting with optional 0-RTT and server-only authentication.
Client authentication can be added as a further option or as an extension
(similar to the current 1.3 proposal) - see below.


[K] symbols represent pointers to key material whose exact derivation is not
included here except for specifying the basic DH values from which the key is
derived (actual derivation will include further information similar to the
extended hash mechanisms or SessionHash proposal considered for 1.3).
Asterisks represent optional fields that the WG can decide to leave as 
mandatory, or simply remove without changing the core cryptographic security 
the protocol. All references to encryption mean "authenticated encryption"
using the encrypt-then-mac paradigm (or any other secure AEAD mechanism).

KeyShare's represent ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values exchanged by the parties.
All the public key and Diffie-Hellman operations are assumed to happen over a
cyclic group with generator g of order q (typically implemented by an elliptic
curve group). We use multiplicative notation where ^ denotes exponentiation as
in g^x, g^{xy} (here xy denotes multiplication of the scalars x and y), etc.
Omitted from the current high level description is a mechanism for testing 
membership of DH values or cofactor exponentiation (the specific mechanism
depends on the group type and is typically very efficient for elliptic 


The server has a long term private-public key pair denoted by (s,g^s) where
s is uniform random in [0..q-1] (we refer to s and g^s as "static keys").
We assume that the server has a certificate that includes the server's public
key g^s and a CA-signed binding of this key to the server's identity.
We discuss the implementation of such certificates below.


ClientData* [K0]       -------->
                                           ServerCertificate* [K1]
                                           ServerFinished [K2]
                       <--------           ServerData* [K2]
ClientFinished* [K2]   -------->

            Protected Application Data [K3]


The basic 1-RTT case omits the ClientData* field. It includes a ClientKeyShare
g^x and a ServerKeyShare g^y and an optional (encrypted) server certificate.
If the certificate is sent (it can be omitted if the client has indicated that
it knows the server key as in the case in the 0-RTT scenario) and is 
the encryption key K1 is derived from g^{xy}.

Key K2 is an encryption key derived from both g^{xs} and g^{xy}. It is used to
authenticate-encrypt the ServerFinished and ClientFinished messages (which
include a hash of the previous traffic) and to encrypt data from the server if
such data is piggybacked to the second message.

Key K3 is the "application key" used to derive key material for protection of
application data.  This key material will include (directional) Authenticated
Encryption keys and, possibly, keys for derivation of further re-key material.
K3 is computed from  both g^{xs} and g^{xy} similarly to K2, but its 
will be different than K2, e.g., using a separating key expansion technique.


The above protocol is compatible with a 0-RTT protocol such as QUIC. In this
case, the client is assumed to have information about the server's public key
and other security parameters. The server is assumed to have some mechanism in
place for detecting replay (e.g., via timestamps, stored client nonces, etc.).
The resulting protocol is as described above where the ClientData field is 
encrypted under key K0 derived from g^{xs}.
The rest of the protocol is identical to the above.
Note: In this case, ServerCertificate is not sent as the client had to know
the server's public key before the first message (one can imagine a setting
where the server may send a different certificate in the second message - if
desired, this can be accommodated too as an option or extension).


Client authentication can be supported via an option or extension. It would
include a client certificate for a static DH key g^c sent in the third message
(the certificate can be encrypted under key K2 to provide client's identity
protection). In this case, the key for computing the ClientFinished message 
the application key K3 would be derived from a combination of the values g^xy,
g^xs, g^yc (and possibly also g^{cs}).


Note on Finished messages: The above spec sets ServerFinished as mandatory and
ClientFinished as optional. The latter option is needed for a 1-RTT protocol.
In principle, both Finished messages could be omitted and still obtain 
via implicit authentication (assuming the inputs to key derivation are chosen
appropriately). But given the advantages of ServerFinished for providing
explicit authentication, key confirmation, and active forward secrecy (see
below), it seems advisable to always include it. Including ClientFinished
provides key confirmation from client and also explicit client authentication
when client certificate is included. ClientFinished also provides Universal
Composable (UC) security (this is a result of the Canetti-Krawczyk proof that
CK security implies UC security when a client confirmation step is included).

Note on certificates: Since in current practice servers hold certificates for
RSA signature keys rather than for static DH keys, the certificate field in 
above protocol will be implemented by a pair consisting of (i) the server's 
signature certificate and (ii) the server's signature using this RSA key on 
server's static public DH key g^s. The latter signature by the server is
performed only when a new static DH key is created (how often this happens and
how many such keys are created is completely up to the server - it has the
advantage that these keys can be changed often to increase security against
leaked keys). This use of RSA also enjoys the high efficiency of RSA
verification for the client.
The handling of Client certificates would be similar.

Note on forward security (a.k.a. as PFS for Perfect Forward Security):
PFS is provided by the (mandatory) use of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys.
The meaning of PFS is that an attacker that finds the (long-term) static
private keys of the parties cannot compromise past session keys. Without the
ServerFinished message the above protocol ensures forward secrecy against
passive attackers (i.e., for sessions where the attacker did not choose g^y).
With ServerFinished, PFS holds also against active attackers.  A similar
consideration applies to ClientFinished.

Client certificates in the first message: We note that in cases where client
certificates can be sent in the clear in the first message of the protocol, 
can provide PFS and mutual authentication in a 1-RTT at essentially the same
cost of an unauthenticated DH exchange (i.e., a cost of little more than two
exponentiations). In such a setting one can also obtain mutual authentication 
a 0-RTT protocol (with forward secrecy with respect to the client's key).
These options, however, require HMQV-like mechanisms and may raise IP issues 
can be investigated further if the WG is interested).