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Re: [TLS] Deprecate SHA1 for signatures in TLS 1.3 (was Re: TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek)

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Mon, 13 July 2015 18:52 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: tls@ietf.org, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 14:52:09 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecate SHA1 for signatures in TLS 1.3 (was Re: TLS 1.3 draft-07 sneak peek)
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On Monday, July 13, 2015 01:11:29 pm Andrei Popov wrote:
> My preference would be to keep the client explicitly advertising its capabilities, and the server strictly honoring the client-advertised capabilities. And since the concept of "default algorithms" confuses people, let's just get rid of it in 1.3. Conveniently, most of this WG no longer wants SHA1 or MD5. Why not just make signature_algorithms (even more) clearly and unambiguously MTI in 1.3?

Yep. I already have that in a WIP branch at the moment. I'm merging together all my WIPs from WG discussion on the topics of alerts and certs here:

https://github.com/davegarrett/tls13-spec/compare/seanfixesredux...davegarrett:alertsandcerts

There's a backlog of PRs on main, so diffing on top of Sean Turner's fixes branch to reduce noise in the diff.


Dave

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