Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, 28 July 2014 04:08 UTC
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 04:08:35 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> writes: >I believe that changing the 5-byte record header will cause us trouble. >Passive IDS/IPS devices follow TLS streams to detect certain attacks. They >will cut connections. Is it really up to the TLS WG to break (or at least constrain) our designs in order to accomodate broken middleboxes? They're not going to understand any of TLS 1.3 anyway and will need to be updated when it comes along, so why keep this legacy header just for them? Peter.
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti