[TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Formatfor TLS

[Alicja Kario <[e-mail]>]

On Friday, 21 February 2025 22:15:06 CET, Muhammad Usama Sardar wrote:
> On 20.02.25 13:36, Alicja Kario wrote:
>
>> if you can't trust the system you're running an application on, you
>> *definitely* can't trust any network connections from it
> It depends on how you define "system" here. If it is the 
> hardware, sure you need to trust it in any case. If it is some 
> parts of software too, then there is a whole field of 
> "Confidential Computing" which claims that adversary (e.g., 
> cloud provider) has complete access to several layers of 
> software stack.

You need to have at least partial trust for everything running below
the application that will be affected by SSLKEYLOGFILE; be it the kernel,
container environment, VM, or CPU (actual hardware).

If you can't be sure that the attacker didn't mess with your environment
variables then you don't have a trustworthy system.

>> sorry, but the threat model you're talking about is not realistic
>
> I disagree with this. The threat model is realistic. See [1-2] 
> and our new draft in progress [3] trying to tackle this threat 
> model.
>
> Usama
>
> [1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10752524
>
> [2] 
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08.html#section-9.1
>
> [3] 
> https://hannestschofenig.github.io/exported-attestation/draft-fossati-rats-exported-attestation.html
>
>
>

-- 
Regards,
Alicja Kario
Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic