Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 22:05 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 18:05:11 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
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On Thursday, April 02, 2015 05:28:09 pm Yoav Nir wrote:
> But that aside, “the web” as represented by the HTTP/2 document made its own profile. For applications other than “the web”, UTA made their BCP document. For the IoT DICE made their profile. 
> 
> So everyone has their own MTI algorithms, some of them contradictory to what we are proposing to recommend. So who takes their MUSTs and SHOULDs from TLS as opposed to their own niche document?

HTTP/2 & 1.1 will be using the MTIs in the TLS 1.3 spec. The additional requirements on TLS in the HTTP/2 spec are explicitly restricted to TLS 1.2 use. (TLS 1.0 & 1.1 being prohibited) The only requirement on TLS 1.3+ use is mandatory usage of SNI.


Dave