Re: [TLS] Cached Info

Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com> Mon, 21 March 2016 14:48 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Cached Info
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On Mar 09, 2016, at 09:16, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:

…snip

> -----------------
> 
> In a nutshell, while I do not believe that the attack described is
> realistic I am sensitive to the problem of creating brittle code.
> 
> If it is OK for the working group then I would like to revert back to
> the previous version of the draft where we use the longer hash.
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes

Hannes,

It’s been 10 days and there’s been no objections so I think it’s safe to revert back to the long hash.

spt