Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 16 April 2018 20:21 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 16:21:27 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
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On Mon, 16 Apr 2018, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

>> * We might want to say that if the TTL is zero then the clients MUST NOT
>>  pin and must clear any pin.  And we might do this in spite of not
>>  describing any pinning semantics -- explicitly leaving pinning
>>  semantics to a future document.
>
> Exactly.  I'd like to suggest that this is the most reasonable
> common ground, and would urge the WG and authors to get behind
> this as a consensus position.

This seems dangerous. If an attacker can re-route and get a rogue
cert, they can set TTL to 0, negating a previously set TTL, without
requiring proof by presenting the denial-of-existence of the TLSA
record. That is also a downgrade attack.

How to go from TTL != 0 to TTL == 0 should be specified carefully,
either in this document or its own document.

The only known save way of going to TTL == 0 is by presenting DoE of
TLSA records (but it does bind using the TLS extension to the existence
of TLSA records)

Paul