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Re: [TLS] PRs for this morning

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Thu, 13 November 2014 20:13 UTC

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Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 12:13:07 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PRs for this morning
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On Nov 13, 2014 12:01 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>
> Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> > Merging session resumption and tickets and moving ticket
> > establishment to a update:
> > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/96
>
>
> In case that you intend to add rfc5077 TLS session ticket support
> to TLSv1.3, is that using the same bogus CBC-Encryption
> (i.e. mac+pad+encrypt instead of pad+mac+encrypt) that Vaudenay
> described as a security issue, that was never fixed in TLS up to v1.2
> and provided the grounds for LuckyThirteen and Poodle?

Ticket encryption is not interop problem. This should be noted for
implementors, but strictly speaking isn't in the protocol.

>
> If yes, then how about fixing a known design flaw _before_
> it is demonstrated to be exploitable?
>

Agreed. But do it EtM so it's obviously secure, no matter what encryption
is used.

>
> -Martin
>
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