Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?
Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Wed, 02 December 2015 23:36 UTC
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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Bryan Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?
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Date: Wed, 02 Dec 2015 23:36:00 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?
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Bryan Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com> writes: >We have repeatedly stated several relevant threat models here; you just >don’t seem to be accepting them as threat models for some reason. That's because they're not actual threat models, just handwringing about vague, undefined bogeymen. Yoav Nir has made a good start, although it's more a wish list than a threat model, or at least a list of desirable properties for the system to have. In crypto terms, it's like stating "I want my cryptosystem to be IND-CPA". The threat there is an adversary being able to encrypt various plaintext messages and being able to distinguish them based on the ciphertext. You can pretty clearly say that against this threat (stage #1 of my list), you need an IND-CPA ciphersystem (stage #2). From there you can decide whether it's worth doing this, stage #3 (OK, any cryptosystem worth its salt had better be IND-CPA, so that's a tautology). OTOH an IND-CPA cryptosystem isn't necessarily secure against an adative chosen ciphertext attack, a different type of threat, so you need to up the defence to an IND-CCA2 secure system. Give me an actual threat model of the type(s) illustrated above, write down the exact capabilities of the attacker so we know what to defend against, and then we can disagree on it. >We have been doing this as well, repeatedly. No, you've just been saying "here's my pet idea, TLS should adopt it" over and over again. I'm happy to keep saying "it doesn't provide the protection you seem to think it does, it restricts TLS to only using AEAD stream ciphers, and it causes serious headaches for implementations" as often as you keep repeating "here's my pet idea, we should use it". Peter.
- [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TL… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Roland Zink
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Roland Zink
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bill Cox
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Short, Todd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jim Schaad
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated headers (… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… GUBALLA, JENS (JENS)
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Mike Copley
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Eric Mill
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Bryan A Ford
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Valery Smyslov
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Bryan Ford
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… GUBALLA, JENS (JENS)
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Valery Smyslov
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated heade… Jeff Burdges
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical fo… Jacob Appelbaum