[TLS] How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake?
Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> Mon, 24 October 2016 18:11 UTC
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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2016 11:10:19 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake?
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How should inability to access key revocation lists impact the TLS handshake, if previous public keys and/or certificate hashes are not cached? I cannot see this in the standard. Considering that all one has to do is DDOS a certificate authority nowadays...
- [TLS] How should inability to access key revocati… Ryan Carboni
- Re: [TLS] How should inability to access key revo… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] How should inability to access key revo… Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] How should inability to access key revo… Eric Rescorla