[TLS] fyi: paper on compelled, certificate creation attack and applicable appliance

=JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> Wed, 24 March 2010 21:07 UTC

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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] fyi: paper on compelled, certificate creation attack and applicable appliance
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Abstract

This paper introduces a new attack, the
compelled certificate creation attack, in which
government agencies compel a certificate au-
thority to issue false SSL certificates that are
then used by intelligence agencies to covertly
intercept and hijack individuals' secure Web-
based communications. We reveal alarming ev-
idence that suggests that this attack is in ac-
tive use. Finally, we introduce a lightweight
browser add-on that detects and thwarts such
attacks.


------- Forwarded Message

Date:    Wed, 24 Mar 2010 15:34:27 -0400
From:    Dave Farber <dave@farber.net>
To:      "ip" <ip@v2.listbox.com>
Subject: [IP] Surveillance via bogus SSL certificates

Begin forwarded message:

 > From: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
 > Date: March 24, 2010 3:09:19 PM EDT
 > To: Dave Farber <dave@farber.net>
 > Subject: Surveillance via bogus SSL certificates
 >

 > Dave,
 >
 > For IP if you'd like.
 >
 > Over a decade ago, I observed that commercial certificate
 > authorities protect you from anyone from whom they are unwilling to
 > take money.  That turns out to be wrong; they don't even do that.
 >
 > Chris Soghoian and Sid Stamm published a paper today that describes
 > a simple "appliance"-type box, marketed to law enforcement and
 > intelligence agencies in the US and elsewhere, that uses bogus
 > certificates issued by *any* cooperative certificate authority to
 > act as a "man-in-the-middle" for encrypted web traffic.
 >
 > Their paper is available at http://files.cloudprivacy.net/ssl-mitm.pdf
 >
 > What I found most interesting (and surprising) is that this sort of
 > surveillance is widespread enough to support fairly mature, turnkey
 > commercial products.    It carries some significant disadvantages
 > for law enforcement -- most particularly it can be potentially can
 > be detected.
 >
 > I briefly discuss the implications of this kind of surveillance at http://www
.crypto.com/blog/spycerts/
 >
 > Also, Wired has a story here: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/packet
- -forensics/
 >
 >
 > -matt
 >
 >
 >



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------- End of Forwarded Message