Re: [TLS] Thoughts on Version Intolerance

[Hubert Kario <[e-mail]>]

On Thursday, 21 July 2016 12:25:48 CEST Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Martin Rex <[e-mail]> writes:
> >Limiting PDU sizes to reasonably sane sizes is perfectly valid behaviour.
> >X.509v3 certificates can theoretically include CAT MPEGs and amount to
> >megabytes.
> 
> We really need a TLS scanner that does this just to see what happens.  When
> I created that cat-MPEG cert, I fed it to both MSIE and Netscape.  Both
> happily accepted it, and then essentially become nonfunctional because
> although they saw nothing wrong with accepting a cert of that size, they
> couldn't actually deal with it.  In Netscape's case I had to delete the .db
> file before it could be used again.  I wouldn't be surprised if you can
> quite effectively DoS assorted TLS implementations with stuff like this.

if you have such certificate, you can use this script from tlsfuzzer to test 
if server won't explode by processing it:
https://github.com/tomato42/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-rsa-sigs-on-certificate-verify.py

(I haven't tested if it actually can send a 2MiB large certificate, but in 
general there are no limits in tlslite-ng or tlsfuzzer, so it should work just 
fine, bugreports welcome if that is not the case).

-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic