Re: [TLS] Update spec to match current practices for certificate chain order

[[e-mail] (Martin Rex)]

Now there would be a different *CORRECT* approach to the below problem,
rather than the dirty hack you described, and that would be fully
backwards compatible:

Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> 
> Now, with respect to cross-certificates, it's a regular occurrence to see
> situations like
> 
> (1) Leaf-signed-by-(2)
> (2) Intermediate-signed-by-(3)
> (3a) Intermediate-signed-by-(4)
> (3b) Intermediate-signed-by-(5)
> (4) Root 1 [an existing root]
> (5) Root 2 [a new root applying for inclusion]
> 
> In this case, valid paths are
> [for old clients]
> (1)+(2)+(3a)+(4)
> 
> [for new clients]
> (1)+(2)+(3b)+(5)
> 
> The maximum compatibility with clients is
> (1)+(2)+(3a)+(4)+(3b)+(5)

The *CORRECT* approach would be to issue a cross-CA certificate
for (5) Root 2 signed by (4) Root 1, lets call it (5b), and
the correct path to send for servers would be

(1)+(2)+(3b)+(5b)+(4)

that would be fully conforming with the existing requirements,
fully comprehensible for clients that feed the certificate_list
from the Certificate handshake message into "Basic Path Validation".

-Martin