Re: [TLS] Inter-protocol attacks

Martin Thomson <> Fri, 15 August 2014 16:56 UTC

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Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 09:56:11 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <>
To: Karthikeyan Bhargavan <>
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Cc: Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <>, "" <>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Inter-protocol attacks
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On 15 August 2014 05:36, Karthikeyan Bhargavan
<> wrote:
> (c) TLS session tickets/resumption are underspecified. Session tickets
> should also include the server_identity, that is the server
> certificate/hash/server name, not just the client_identity (see
> Then, during resumption, the
> client should indicate the certificate/server name it wishes to connect to
> (e.g. via SNI) so that S’ can check that the resumed connection is for the
> same certificate/server name.

I think that this is pretty much the right answer.  Since session
tickets are basically the server talking to itself, it's really only
something we can only recommend in a specification.  Deployments that
don't have multiple configurations aren't going to need a binding, but
those that do should be binding the ticket to the configuration.  In
the end, it's probably best to recommend the binding for all cases to
avoid usage issues.

I don't want to make applications responsible for this, at least to
the extent that is possible.