Re: [TLS] What does it mean to not include 0-RTT message in the handshake hash?

On Thu, Dec 24, 2015 at 4:26 PM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Thursday, December 24, 2015 03:40:26 pm Christian Huitema wrote:
> > On Monday, December 21, 2015 6:30 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> > > On 22 December 2015 at 13:25, Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com
> >
> > > wrote:
> > > >> Unless I'm confused (which is possible given the time of night),
> > > >> the intention, as you say, is to separate out the 0-RTT handshake
> > > >> messages i.e., (cert, cert verify, finished) from the 1-RTT
> computations.
> > > >
> > > > OK. That does not simplify implementations using running hashes...
> > >
> > > It does if you consider the possibility of having to drop the 0-RTT
> data.
> >
> > That's right. In fact, it may be a good idea to add to the spec a
> description of a "Failed 0-RTT handshake." If I understand correctly, the
> following will happen:
> >
> > * Server will receive the client hello, ignore the Early Data Indication
> extension, and proceed as in 1-RTT.
> > * Server will indicate that by not adding an Early Data Indication to
> the server hello.
> > * Server will receive a series of 0-RTT messages that it cannot
> decipher, and just drop the messages.
> > * Client will receive server hello, and proceed as per 1-RTT. Client API
> will signal that 0-RTT data was lost, application may decide to retransmit.
> > * Server may send client authentication requests. Client will have to
> repeat the authentication messages, even if it already sent them as 0-RTT.
> >
> > In that scenario, the handshake hash cannot include the 0-RTT messages,
> since the server does not in fact receive them, and they do not contribute
> to the state of the connection.
> >
> > We can of course debate whether the 0-RTT messages should also not be
> included in the hash if the 0-RTT exchange was successful, the messages
> were received, and they contributed to the state of the connection. If they
> are not included, then the "Finished" HMAC does not offer a protection
> against tampering. This may open the possibility of some kind of
> substitution or replay attack.
> >
> > The failed 0-RTT handshake scenario also has interesting consequences on
> the Record layer. We have a legitimate scenario in which received records
> cannot be decrypted. This should not trigger alarms. And the numbering
> scheme should be robust against these missing records.
>
> Do we have anything that protects against an intermediary stripping 0RTT
> messages from a handshake to force a fallback?
>

Yes:
1. The EarlyDataIndication tells the server that some 0-RTT messages are
coming.
2. The Finished in the 0-RTT flight covers the entire handshake flight,
thus preventing
tampering with those messages.
3. The server's Finished covers the ClientHello, thus preventing tampering
with that.

-Ekr

Could we just make the handshake hash use the encrypted messages,
> regardless of if it can decrypt them? (maybe for all messages?)
>
>
> Dave
>
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