[TLS] Chair -Moderated: Fwd: Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Thu, 15 March 2018 11:24 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 11:24:06 +0000
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Subject: [TLS] Chair -Moderated: Fwd: Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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I have placed this poster in the moderator queue based on RFC2418: Participation is by individual technical contributors, rather than by formal representatives of organizations [0].  They can rejoin using a personal account or identify who they are in their email’s signature.

spt

[0] https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=2418#section-1


> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> From: Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>;
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
> Date: March 14, 2018 at 22:08:44 GMT
> To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>;
> Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>;
> 
> The requirements for visibility exist in an array of regulated environments worldwide.  It is one of the presentation areas in the Hot Middlebox Workshop.  http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=1 <http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=1>
> 
> The Middlebox Hackathon site is also now public so everyone can experience how a browser plug-in client (to be provided) can be used in conjunction with a fine grained Middlebox Security Protocol for Middlebox discovery and controlled visibility by an end-user in a way that meets both user and regulatory interests.  The draft specification will be published in two weeks.
> 
> --the Hot Middlebox organizers
> 
> On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com <mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
> 
> >    So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption by
>     the decryption service, something that the security considerations
>     neglects to include in its list.
> 
> So I think this is an important point.  I assume the authors did not realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this right.  In the US, we have been having arguments where the national police force (FBI) is insisting that tech companies can create a "golden key" that only they can use, and the security people are saying it is impossible.  This seems like another instance, no?
> 
> Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:  Russ, did you know this or was Martin's point new to you?
> 
>         /r$
> 
> 
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