Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack
Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 30 December 2017 09:04 UTC
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <1514610214269.6873@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2017 11:04:18 +0200
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Jitendra Lulla <lullajd@yahoo.com>
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References: <1890717233.6710973.1514584277146.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1890717233.6710973.1514584277146@mail.yahoo.com> <1514610214269.6873@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack
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> On 30 Dec 2017, at 7:03, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote: > > Jitendra Lulla <lullajd@yahoo.com> writes: > >> The client can have a rogue TLS implementation with the following intentional >> changes: >> >> 0. Choose CBC with AES256-SHA56 or any other heavier (in terms of processing >> power requirements) and non paralleliz'able cipher suite. >> >> 1. After the handshake, always send all the TLS records (Application Data) >> plain text fragment size which is no greater than 1 Byte. >> >> 2. Always send a padding of max possible or big size (eg 256 Bytes) > > Apart from (2), that looks like interactive terminal traffic over TLS. The > large padding may also be natually sent by an implementation that's trying a > bit too hard to hide typing/traffic patterns. Right. If you really want to hide typing patterns, you should send a big record every tenth of a second. Most of those would be zero-length fragments, but that’s OK. In fact, the rogue client can do even better by just sending a bunch of zero-length records. Yoav
- [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Jitendra Lulla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Jitendra Lulla
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 : small fragments attack Yoav Nir