[TLS] Fwd: OPS-DIR review of draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 09 March 2017 07:46 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 09:46:35 +0200
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Cc: Bert Wijnen <bwietf@bwijnen.net>
Subject: [TLS] Fwd: OPS-DIR review of draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14
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Also forwarding to TLS

I have created https://github.com/tlswg/rfc4492bis/pull/34 <https://github.com/tlswg/rfc4492bis/pull/34>

I’ll merge this if there are no objections just before the submission cut-off and submit a new version.

Yoav

> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: OPS-DIR review of draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14
> Date: 9 March 2017 at 8:34:13 GMT+2
> To: "Bert Wijnen (IETF)" <bwietf@bwijnen.net>
> Cc: draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis.all@ietf.org, "ops-dir@ietf.org" <ops-dir@ietf.org>
> 
> Hi, Bert.
> 
> Thanks for the review.  See below
> 
> On 8 Mar 2017, at 20:14, Bert Wijnen (IETF) <bwietf@bwijnen.net <mailto:bwietf@bwijnen.net>> wrote:
> 
>> I did the OPS Directorate review for draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14
>> 
>> Summary:ready for publication
>> 
>> As far as I can tell, this document describes a number of ecc
>> cipher suites that can be used by TLS servers and clients. It describes
>> the interaction btween the client and server for the various cipher
>> suites used.
>> 
>> So for all I can tell, this has no operational or network management
>> impacts on the internet.
>> 
>> 
>> NITS:
>> - abstract states:
>> 
>>   protocol.  In particular, it specifies the use of Ephemeral Elliptic
>>   Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE)....
>> 
>>  I would have expected the acronym to be EECDH ???
> 
> Well, yes. But this was the initialism used in the original RFC 4492 in 2006, and now it’s used everywhere including in ciphersuite names and in codebases everywhere.
> Nor was this invented for 4492. Finite field Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman has been referred to as DHE at least as far back as the TLS 1.0 RFC (RFC 2246) from 1999. Probably earlier.
> 
>>  in fact the text in section 2:
>> 
>>    All of them use Ephemeral ECDH (ECDHE)....
>>   makes me think that indeed EECDH is a much better acronym or abbreviation
>>  But you can ignore this, it is probably just my preference how I would
>>  abbreviate.
> 
> I agree. But the term is used in codebases everywhere. We’re probably as stuck with it as we are with the referer field: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-5.5.2 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-5.5.2>
> 
> Another issue that came up in the discussion is in section 2.3: ECDH_anon uses an ephemeral EC key, so it should have been ECDHE_anon.  This also follows the naming of the anonymous finite-field diffie hellman in 2246: DH_anon.  We decided not to change that.
> 
>> - Introdiuction states:
>> 
>> o the use of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme with ephemeral keys to establish the TLS premaster secret, and o the use of ECDSA certificates for authentication of TLS peers.
>> 
>> Why do you use the full text (not acronym) in the first bullet and only an acronym in the 2nd bullet? Bert
> 
> Good point. Since these are expanded in the abstract, I guess I can just use the initialism in there.  But I definitely should mention EdDSA in the second bullet.
> 
> Yoav