Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Thu, 01 October 2020 01:06 UTC
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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 18:06:22 -0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Achim Kraus <achimkraus@gmx.net>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 8:12 AM Salz, Rich <rsalz= 40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > PSK is in the RFC. And in fact we made a point of unifying it and other > mechanisms in the protocol. > I don't really feel strongly about it (because it doesn't matter to me), but it could be taken out of the 8446-bis document. I might also add that not all sections of every document are viewed with equal respect. thanks, Rob
- [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Filippo Valsorda
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Filippo Valsorda
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 David Woodhouse
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Lanlan Pan
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Filippo Valsorda
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Rob Sayre