Subject: [TLS] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10.txt
From: tirumal reddy <[email-masked]>
To: "<[email-masked]>" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2026 17:48:29 +0530
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>

Hi ,

The main changes in
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update/ addresses
the session resumption threat identified by the FATT team. The revised
draft also tightens serialization rules between EKU and post-handshake
client authentication to address the comments from Ilari.

Best Regards,
-Tiru

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2026 at 17:39
Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10.txt
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>

Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10.txt is now available.
It
is a work item of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.

   Title:   Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3
   Authors: Hannes Tschofenig
            Michael Tüxen
            Tirumaleswar Reddy
            Steffen Fries
            Yaroslav Rosomakho
   Name:    draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10.txt
   Pages:   41
   Dates:   2026-03-02

Abstract:

   TLS 1.3 ensures forward secrecy by performing an ephemeral Diffie-
   Hellman key exchange during the initial handshake, protecting past
   communications even if a party's long-term keys (typically a private
   key with a corresponding certificate) are later compromised.  While
   the built-in KeyUpdate mechanism allows application traffic keys to
   be refreshed during a session, it does not incorporate fresh entropy
   from a new key exchange and therefore does not provide post-
   compromise security.  This limitation can pose a security risk in
   long-lived sessions, such as those found in industrial IoT or
   telecommunications environments.

   To address this, this specification defines an extended key update
   mechanism that performs a fresh Diffie-Hellman exchange within an
   active session, thereby ensuring post-compromise security.  By
   forcing attackers to exfiltrate new key material repeatedly, this
   approach mitigates the risks associated with static key compromise.
   Regular renewal of session keys helps contain the impact of such
   compromises.  The extension is applicable to both TLS 1.3 and DTLS
   1.3.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-10

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts

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