Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS

Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> Tue, 12 January 2016 20:04 UTC

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Fixing TLS
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Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 20:03:42 +0000
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References: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4BC6849@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz> <201601121202.26624.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <CAH9QtQFASZENynns9=o-zHk=orfR6PcqKL9v5ByirmVcTQAQeA@mail.gmail.com> <201601121439.15891.davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS
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> I hope that Google's efforts to get QUIC as-is specced out go quickly and smoothly, and that it can be used as a basis to develop an official total TCP/TLS replacement.

If this were the path forward (and I doubt that it is), I would very much prefer Peter Gutman's evolutionary TLS 1.3.

Cheers,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dave Garrett
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2016 11:39 AM
To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@google.com>;
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS

On Tuesday, January 12, 2016 02:27:02 pm Bill Cox wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 9:02 AM, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>;
> wrote:
> > On Tuesday, January 12, 2016 09:03:53 am Peter Gutmann wrote:
> >
> > I'll be the bearer of bad news and tell you that your proposal has 
> > come up in multiple forms. I suggested a similar thing a while back 
> > and far before me others have as well. The chairs have, however, 
> > long declared consensus that we want to focus on a single new 
> > version not leaving out other more complex changes, namely latency 
> > improvements. The primary argument is that TLS version adoption 
> > rates are horrible and we would be far better suited to one major 
> > upgrade rather than incremental changes that would likely inhibit 
> > adoption of the more complex changes that we also need. (just a 
> > quick summary from my view; someone else can chime in here if they 
> > need to)
> >
> > I can't dispute this position, though personally I think it's not 
> > the best move. That said, if we were going to do a more incremental 
> > TLS version, doing it along side HTTP/2 to avoid the messy TLS 
> > restrictions it ended up with would have been the way to go. That 
> > ship has sailed, and we're now well into TLS 1.3 development, so I 
> > guess I'm now on board with working to finalize the work that we're 
> > already doing (frankly, with a rename to TLS
> > 2.0 being a good idea). If you can somehow drum up consensus to 
> > overturn the previous consensus, more power to you, but I think 
> > that's not likely to be the best route anymore.
> 
> I'll just second what David said here.  0-RTT mode is here to stay, 
> and I don't see a simple upgrade path from TLS 1.2.  Speed matters, 
> and 0-RTT is a huge upgrade for users.  The trick is doing this securely...
> 
> My opinion counts little here, and TLS 1.3 is already nearly 
> completely defined, so I think it is too late for this discussion.  
> However, if it were not...
> 
> A clean-slate TLS 2.0 which reuses as little as possible, and 
> simplifies life as much as possible, would have been preferable, IMO.  
> I look at the QUIC crypto code and then go back to the TLS/SSL code, 
> and there is a night and day difference in complexity.  I think it is 
> going to be painful for some of us to watch the simple, clean QUIC 
> crypto code move to the archives and get replaced with TLS 1.3, which 
> is surely going to be a substantial bolt-on of code to the existing 
> TLS 1.2 code base.  It takes a super-genius just to see all the 
> potential pitfalls in the TLS 1.2 code as it is.  I think it will be even harder to analyze after the TLS 1.3 bolt-on.
> Fortunately, we seem to have a large number of super-geniuses working 
> in TLS, much of the present company on this thread included :)  
> However, if I personally were making changes to the code, it would be 
> maybe 4X faster to do it in QUIC crypto, and 4X more likely that I 
> would not introduce a critical bug in the process.
> 
> I think it is natural for many members of this email list to discount 
> this complexity issue in TLS 1.2/1.3, since many of the most brilliant 
> programmers see the existing code as not all that complex.  For 
> regular mortal programmers out there like me, we would very much 
> appreciate a clean-slate effort with minimal complexity, and there are 
> a lot of lessons you folks have learned over the years that could be included.
> 
> Maybe next time, in TLS 1.4? :-p

Personally, I hope this new version of TLS, save for possibly some minor update & extensions, is the final version. I hope that Google's efforts to get QUIC as-is specced out go quickly and smoothly, and that it can be used as a basis to develop an official total TCP/TLS replacement. (the early documentation for QUIC was horrible, but the current work is vastly improved) As far as I'm concerned, TLS 1.3 is a transitional measure which should only be used in the medium-term by those who adopt new tech very slowly, and in the long-term phased out entirely. It is a very important transitional measure that needs to be done with as high a security and performance as possible, but a finite one nonetheless. (well, arguably, pretty much everything is, given a long enough timeframe ;) We have to get through the short-term to get to the long-term, though.


Dave

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