Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Sat, 12 September 2020 03:52 UTC

From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Static DH timing attack
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Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2020 03:51:51 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack
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Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> writes:

>I am sure you know that ephemeral-static DH was original used for S/MIME. The
>reasoning for ephemeral-static DH was not to make it work like RSA. Rather,
>the idea was to provide authentication of the static DH key holder by
>certifying the static DH public key.

... thus making it quack like RSA, with a certified static public key.  That's
exactly the point I was making about running DH sideways, taking a key
agreement mechanism and beating it into a form where it worked more like RSA
key transport.

Peter.

[TLS] Static DH timing attack Salz, Rich
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Dmitry Belyavsky
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Karthik Bhargavan
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Achim Kraus
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Dan Brown
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Hugo Krawczyk
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Salz, Rich
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Salz, Rich
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Russ Housley
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Filippo Valsorda
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Peter Gutmann
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Filippo Valsorda
Re: [TLS] Static DH timing attack Lanlan Pan