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Re: [TLS] ban more old crap (was: A la carte concerns from IETF 93)

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Thu, 23 July 2015 16:45 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 12:43:40 -0400
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References: <201507221610.27729.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <201507231143.46288.davemgarrett@gmail.com> <20150723160034.GV4347@mournblade.imrryr.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ban more old crap (was: A la carte concerns from IETF 93)
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On Thursday, July 23, 2015 12:00:34 pm Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 11:43:45AM -0400, Dave Garrett wrote:
> > Plus, "MUST" use DHE or ECDHE for ALL connections, even back to TLS 1.0,
> > or abort with a fatal error.
> 
> Who's going to police the Internet to remove all the legacy services?

I'm not proposing a non-PFS diediedie RFC; just that no TLS 1.3+ server should ever be willing to negotiate non-PFS. (again, with very limited possible exceptions)

I was probably unclear, but I'm primarily talking about server-side here, as it was a reply to a server-side issue. Clients SHOULD only be negotiating PFS, but I think servers MUST only negotiate PFS.

> Exchange 2003 has a broken 3DES implementation.  The only working
> ciphersuites are RC4-SHA/RC4-MD5.

RC4 already got a diediedie RFC. If their 3DES stays broken, and nothing better is available, it's already considered illegitimate to continue using. Also, I don't care. It is not the role of the TLS 2015 WG to work around bugs in abandoned software from 12 years ago.


Dave

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