Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 14 March 2018 23:49 UTC

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To: nalini elkins <nalini.elkins@e-dco.com>
Cc: Artyom Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On 14/03/18 23:32, nalini elkins wrote:
> But, it is a very difficult issue.   If I can use a different analogy, if
> the City of Monterey built a new sewer system and told me that to connect
> to it, I had to build a new house, I would scream!

Analogies cannot be used to draw conclusions, merely to illustrate.
That analogy doesn't help illustrate anything for me fwiw.

> TLS is used in many, many places.  The Internet is critical to the
> businesses of the world. 

Yes. Both fine reasons to not mess about with, weaken or
try break the TLS protocol.

BTW - while you and others may constantly over-claim and
say your consortium represents "enterprises," I assume you
do not claim to represent all "business." ;-)

>  You can't just say use something other than
> TLS.   

Yes. I can. Kerberos and IPsec are used within many enterprise
networks. TLS is not the only tool in the toolbox.

If your consortium want a multi-party security protocol that
does not affect other folks' security as you seem to claim,
then that is the obvious route to explore. And that protocol
needs to be non-interoperable with TLS (maybe even non-confusable
in some stronger sense) IMO in order to avoid the risks that
breaking TLS would result in us all taking.

> Or don't use the Internet.  It's not so easy.

I never said that. Why invent something like that?

> I wish we could actually talk to each other quietly and reasonably.  This
> is a very, very difficult problem.

I am just fine with talking openly on the mailing list, as
per IETF processes. I see no benefit in smokey back room
discussions here at all, and only downsides to such.

S.