Re: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 11 January 2016 23:43 UTC

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Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 23:43:14 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Deprecating TLS 1.0, 1.1 and SHA1 signature algorithms
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On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 11:38:25PM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:

> Yes, per RFC 5246: 
> "   If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
>    certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
>    hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension."

Yes.  Though for the record, and as discussed ad nauseam before,
this is a bug in the RFC, and should not be implemented as written.
(Please let's not re-open that thread).

Ideally, at some point SChannel will implement the TLS 1.3 draft
bug fix also for TLS 1.2.

-- 
	Viktor.