Re: [TLS] drop obsolete SSL 2 backwards compatibility from TLS 1.3 draft

[Dave Garrett <[e-mail]>]

On Saturday, December 27, 2014 08:38:56 pm Brian Smith wrote:
> Servers generally cannot flip switches on the client.

I'm referring to situations where an organization has legacy software they use 
with old clients and an old server. In a case like that, they would be capable 
of pushing a pref change to their clients easily enough.

If we're talking about obsolete clients on the general web, then no, obviously. 
I just prefer breakage over perpetuating its legitimacy.

> I want TLS 1.3 to be deployed widely and quickly after it's been
> standardized, and I want people to be able to put it into production
> use during the standardization effort so we get the same kind of
> interop testing that HTTP/2 got. This requires that the TLS 1.3 spec
> should try to avoid breaking how earlier versions of TLS work, unless
> there is a very strong reason to do so.

Very much agreed, however I argue that legacy complexity and its resultant risks 
are strong enough, and that not enough clients would break to justify keeping 
it. (the later could unfortunately be swayed with stats that say otherwise)


Dave