Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension?
Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Fri, 27 November 2009 15:41 UTC
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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: ekr@networkresonance.com
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 16:41:15 +0100
In-Reply-To: <20091127151113.BDEF16C3795@kilo.networkresonance.com> from "Eric Rescorla" at Nov 27, 9 07:11:12 am
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension?
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Eric Rescorla wrote: > > This requires breaking the current clean definition of handshake > hashes as the hash of all the handshake messages and simply adding > some synthetic message in the middle. "The current clean definition" of the handshake message hash is what has gotten us into the trouble. So we are not breaking it, we are fixing it. We're not doing any wire-format changes, so implementations that have not implemented renegotiation at all are not even affected by this change. That is definitely much cleaner as having everyone run around with a band-aid on their ClientHello and ServerHello handshake messages when renegotiating. It's encrypted, so most people will not see it, but it's still there! I don't think this is anywhere > near as clean, as evidenced by the ongoing debate about whether to put > it the synthetic data in the front, the back, incorporate it into the > PRF, or chain the pre-existing handshake messages. [FWIW, I think I > prefer the last of these implicit versions.] Making a rarely-used option that came several years after most of the currently installed base a retroactive mandatory-to-implement feature of the protocol, THAT is dirty and ugly. -Martin
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Robert Relyea
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Yngve N. Pettersen (Developer Opera Software ASA)
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello peter.robinson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Min Huang
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Pasi.Eronen
- [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verify da… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Stefan Santesson
- [TLS] What would be the point of removing signall… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Dr Stephen Henson
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Perhaps there's another way. Was: Verif… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Simon Josefsson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Pasi.Eronen
- Re: [TLS] Avoiding first use of RI in ClientHello Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] What would be the point of removing sig… Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? David-Sarah Hopwood
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Stefan Santesson
- Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension? Yoav Nir