Re: [TLS] ops review of draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie

Stephen Farrell <> Sun, 22 March 2015 12:43 UTC

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Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 12:43:30 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <>
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To: "Fred Baker (fred)" <>, "" <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] ops review of draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie
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Thanks Fred for the thoughtful review.

I think one thing is worth double-checking. You said:

On 22/03/15 06:29, Fred Baker (fred) wrote:
> One implication that the document doesn’t bring out directly, but
> which follows from the discussion of the attacks, is that any key or
> certificate that has been exchanged using SSL may have been
> compromised via a man-in-the-middle attack, and is therefore suspect.
> Such certificates and keys should be replaced

I don't think that is the case, as SSL's imperfections bad as they
are, don't expose long-term (private) keying material. But it is
worth checking. Short-term keys will naturally be replaced without
any operator action in any SSL->TLS transition I think. And any
trust anchors that were accepted via self-signed certificates will
be as good or bad as ever and are probably best left alone if one
isn't changing s/w but just a config.

So I don't see an operator action here that we ought document in
this draft. But if there were things operators ought do, that are
not purely implementation specific issues, then I think those'd be
worth noting in the document, so this is just to check that. If
someone knows of such, please send text and the WG can process

As the relevant AD, I'll interpret silence here as "no change