Re: [TLS] DSA should die
Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> Wed, 01 April 2015 23:04 UTC
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Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2015 18:04:19 -0500
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From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
To: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA should die
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+1 My pet oddity was inherited DSA parameters from a certificate chain. (Don't even know if that's supported in many implementations.) -tom
- [TLS] DSA should die Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Stephen Checkoway
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Tom Ritter
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die CodesInChaos
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] DSA should die Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Aaron Zauner
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Dmitry Belyavsky
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cip… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA shou… Yoav Nir