Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 22 September 2016 06:34 UTC

Return-Path: <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6EC512B668 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:34:43 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.7
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id mlFyjEacTnOK for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:34:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-wm0-x234.google.com (mail-wm0-x234.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::234]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 28BD112B63F for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:34:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-wm0-x234.google.com with SMTP id w84so233127771wmg.1 for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:34:42 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=ZcopOHxvmoFZ02YU8Nso85pDjbeXRyJltUTtv/Cqt2c=; b=C5XAG8VVGK0KNAV2CE8b7rkYvhZChoCXJh1t8zcKPuUfNdUQcb8y2DUCb+rrTv6MAq wvqvBs2XwhRoIh5Fgx1qm+wV9gP1sanXpqTBU+HjxEjkEwuhFMAAfPDRONVp5UGnxCQn K3gSIJYtBBn0ZgpegAiFYAvbQU6JlQQ44Z4ePvlQODdRq+E8JB9zOTKCnJ65btRYb76p 9Fdv6/C9jfoJ+mElRMqudgvfJjFZ8k9KGd/YiPBgvML5ctN5qBZALLeIFmDM4kGPUFOJ IUSRzcdExZIBi/R/JqMYl5yaS0hHR/OEojg/T9FV9O8rbhXg4mgoPCaJY7YlbZsG2oxY 9hCQ==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=ZcopOHxvmoFZ02YU8Nso85pDjbeXRyJltUTtv/Cqt2c=; b=JFHei2GAv/0ly1qc5jU3lYV7IUTyOY4BLDzPXrjswYj5rKiou4L8Q09kvN7hpwQBXG WWFEbO2jpOwEXLMoZ8/JWb0swtcMrTd9PJ4to932DnGe4O7QYnV1aswinsvYcY2y/6ER psdisxtFLIrV8LUOblXzYICJzKkJBg/nJ5tUtUtExDHTE+fLdq6/TRDGkT4sBvGV8RjC C2v7Z3qxBsQByh2XWU5VQTspLd18t1zbqXafeKbbSYOQSB7+a2eg6Du5gkpZuxjJ4uI0 Xu7kpi+qykw5DoIRIOcY5+WH6USvtDlkSTkrdxZASZoRUjj4GneR8WF7eTNsJJasdvLO C98Q==
X-Gm-Message-State: AE9vXwMxNJlxR0CfEwUq7mG+DgvIkDRlc+IvYTXsS7FAuGUkiiGlLC9otuTXm4NVxq+gpw==
X-Received: by 10.28.197.138 with SMTP id v132mr748288wmf.100.1474526080664; Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:34:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.1.14] ([46.120.57.147]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a5sm409000wjd.9.2016.09.21.23.34.38 (version=TLS1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Wed, 21 Sep 2016 23:34:39 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 9.3 \(3124\))
From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <1474521100084.53938@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 09:34:37 +0300
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <841586B2-1E78-403F-BF4B-214AFB55CFCA@gmail.com>
References: <57D2E218020000AC0011B17E@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <20160909152901.9008C1A552@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp> <1473853106532.3256@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <57D96E34020000AC0011B73F@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <57E25106020000AC0011BF3A@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <CABkgnnX7X+21wjChxkW-uhd8WXAMyp5f1F74H5ja=1mui4POiQ@mail.gmail.com> <57E272CB020000AC0011BF63@gwia2.rz.hs-offenburg.de> <1474473207998.35647@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <CABkgnnWUwPeSeLBO8OyvKmb6MBBfNxPWEXw59_Kzkuby-WqDNQ@mail.gmail.com> <1474521100084.53938@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3124)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LCPEo2twX380cRUDF2leTHug3qs>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Suspicious behaviour of TLS server implementations
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 06:34:44 -0000

> On 22 Sep 2016, at 8:11 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>; wrote:
> 
> Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>; writes:
> 
>> The advantage with deploying a new protocol is that you can be strict. If, 
>> for example, all of the browsers implement TLS 1.3 and are strict, then 
>> Amazon won't be able to deploy a buggy 1.3 implementation without noticing 
>> pretty quickly.  You might suggest that that's aspiration to the point of 
>> delusion, but in fact it worked out pretty well with HTTP/2 deployment.  We 
>> didn't squash ALL of the nasty bugs, but we got most of them.
> 
> It also means you're going to be in for a rude shock when you encounter the
> ocean of embedded/SCADA/IoT devices with non-mainstream TLS implementations.
> The reason why HTTP/2 "works" is that it essentially forked HTTP, HTTP/2 for
> Google, Amazon, etc, and the browser vendors, and HTTP 1.1 for everything 
> else that uses HTTP as its universal substrate.  As a result there will be 
> two versions of HTTP in perpetuity, HTTP 1.1 and HTTP-whatever-the-current-
> version-is.

Perhaps. But if at some point all websites use HTTP-whatever-the-current-version-is then maybe browsers can remove support for HTTP/1.1 and then your embedded/SCADA/IoT devices won’t give us that rude shock.

I honestly don’t think that having two protocols for these two radically different use cases is a bad outcome.

Yoav