Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Fri, 14 December 2018 21:11 UTC

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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 22:11:38 +0100 (CET)
CC: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Further TLS 1.3 deployment updates
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Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>; wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 04:21:43PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote:
>> We have one more update for you all on TLS 1.3 deployment issues. Over the
>> course of deploying TLS 1.3 to Google servers, we found that JDK 11
>> unfortunately implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly. On resumption, it fails to
>> send the SNI extension. This means that the first connection from a JDK 11
>> client will work, but subsequent ones fail.
>> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806
> 
> I'm told that OpenSSL accidentally takes the SNI from the initial
> connection on resumption if there's no SNI in the resumption.  This
> seems like a very good workaround for the buggy JDK 11 TLS 1.3 client,
> as it has no fingerprinting nor downgrade considerations.

Just that this workaround is a no-go for any layered approach
to SNI, where server-side processing of SNI is outside of the TLS stack.

-Martin